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this economic historian a lot of attention from the media as well as from
economists of all stripes. Employing extensive historical data from many na-
tions, he has contested the usual presumption of most economists that the big-
ger the government, the weaker the economy. This connection between
government and economic growth is also the topic of his Clemens lecture at
Saint John’s.
Dr. Peter H. Lindert
“Does Big Government Hurt
Economic Growth?”1
Peter H. Lindert
University of California - Davis
In any election in any democracy, the battle usually centers on the role of
government in our lives. Is a larger government worth its cost? Does it raise or
lower our livelihood, and does it raise or lower our basic individual freedoms?
This central conflict in the values of the political left and right cannot be fully
resolved by better facts about how government works. We can, however, move
closer to social peace just by learning where the facts reject the divisive claims of
one side or the other. When it comes to the economic effects of big government,
the time is ripe for rejecting some traditional bad arguments with the help of fresh
facts.
A Road Map
The first step is to map out what government should do, what kinds of activity
define big versus small government in democratic countries, and my main
judgments, or “punch lines,” about how the size of government affects our lives.
For all their fights, economists broadly agree on two features of what govern-
ments should and should not do. Governments should intervene to correct for
“externalities,” or spillover effects of private activities on the rest of society. When
a private activity would benefit the rest of society as a whole, government should
have those outsiders pay for part of the activity, through subsidies. Examples
include public health and public education. When a private activity does some-
thing bad to the rest of society, government should tax or punish those who engage
in that activity. Examples include pollution and crime. On the other hand, when
the private market works pretty well, as with most private markets, government
should leave it alone. A favorite example for most economists is international
trade, which brings beneficial competition.
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Industrialized democracies differ in the size of their governments mainly
because they differ in the share of income taxed to pay for social programs. Not
military spending or roads or postal service, but such social spending as welfare,
unemployment benefits, public pensions, public health care, and public schools
explain why countries like Sweden tax and spend over half of gross domestic
product (GDP), while countries like the United States tax and spend less than
forty percent. In other words, big government means the welfare state.
A welfare state, alias a big-government democracy, is one in which government
spending on those safety nets and human investments takes more than a fifth of
GDP. The leading examples are the Nordic countries, Austria, and the Nether-
lands. By contrast, less than fifteen percent of GDP is devoted to government
safety nets and human investments in the low-tax and low-spending countries,
especially the United States, Japan, Switzerland, and the poor countries of the
Third World.
Many people think that getting the government involved in providing public
schools and safety nets for the poor, the sick, and the elderly merely crowds out
private and religious charity. In their view, people would get the same support
from the rest of society whether or not the government was involved. If that were
true, we would not need to pay taxes to offer that kind of help. We could leave it
to those who volunteer their money and time. It has never been true, however.
Back when the government stayed out of the business of giving, the poor and sick
and elderly received only pittances from the churches or any other philanthropists.
There were hundreds of charities, but they gave mainly to the non-poor by
supporting elite education or religious worship itself. The poor got a lot of moral
instruction, but little material support.2 Now that the government has moved into
the business of giving aid and social insurance, private giving has actually risen, not
declined. Government transfer programs thus define the world of generous total
aid, not just the world of generous government handouts.
As we turn our attention toward the social-spending definition of big govern-
ment, now meaning the welfare state, we need to notice what kinds of government
economic activity are not covered here. The welfare state does not include special
aid to any powerful producer lobbies, other than those in health and education.
It does not include farm programs, which benefit a small group of households with
above-average income and wealth. It does not include Southwestern Europe’s
strict Job Protection Laws, which make it illegal to fire most senior workers, and
therefore unprofitable to hire new workers. It does not include protection against
imports, like the barriers imposed by the Bush administration against shrimp,
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steel, TV sets, beds, and bras over these last three years. These exclusions are key
to understanding how the welfare state affects growth, because these excluded
activities happen to be the kinds of government economic activity that have the
worst effects on overall national income. In fact, the welfare states tend to be fairly
open small economies, as in Scandinavia, or Austria, or the Netherlands. They
expose workers and firms to the competitive winds, but they help them adjust to
those winds.
Now that big government has been defined in terms of social programs that
transfer taxpayer money to the poor, the sick, the elderly, and school children, here
are my key punch lines about its economic effects and its future:
• Larger welfare states have not had any net cost, either in terms of economic
growth or in terms of budget deficits. Had our politics permitted it, we
Americans could have had the same economic growth of GDP — with more
security, more equality, and longer lives.
• The future may bring budget crisis for pensions and public health, even if there
is no long-run loss of GDP. The tensions over public spending on pensions
and health care are caused by three good things: Long life, prosperity, and
medical advances.
• The budget crisis is not related to the choice between private markets and large
welfare states, either today or in the geriatric future.
• The pension crisis is very serious in some countries, but not in America and
not in most welfare states. The countries that have it worst are Japan and Italy.
• The health care crisis is more serious in the United States than in any other
rich country. Our mixture of private and public health care doesn’t work.
The “Free Lunch” Puzzle
The bad effects of big welfare states on economic growth are widely trumpeted
— but they do not exist. There is no net loss in our GDP and incomes from the
welfare state package as a whole.
So say the facts, both when you look at them in the raw and when you statistically
measure the different forces that determine economic growth. Looking at the raw
facts, you find that there is no international correlation at all between the share of
social spending in the economy and either the level or the growth of GDP. If you
hear somebody cite a case where a low-tax country grew faster than a welfare state,
you need to know that they are being selective. The opposite is true just as often.
For example, the US income advantage over Europe is smaller today than back
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before Europe had any welfare states.
The costs are also invisible among the states of the U.S. States like Connecticut
and California have higher taxes and more generous social benefits. Idaho and
Alabama don’t believe in taxes or social programs. That has been true for a century.
So why haven’t Connecticut and California become as poor as the national
average? Why haven’t Idaho and Alabama become as rich as the national average?
Of course, places differ in other ways than just their views of taxes and welfare.
So we need a deeper statistical analysis that gives many forces their due. I have done
that, and so have other economists.3 The net cost just isn’t there. It’s zero. The
welfare state looks like a free lunch, for the nation as a whole.
How can that be? Some Secrets Americans Should Learn
Facing facts like these, if you have always believed that the social programs
should be very costly, you have a tough choice to make. You can choose to be
strong. Stand by your beliefs. Don’t let the facts push you around. Or you can be
a wimp. I am a wimp. I let the facts push me around. I react to them by asking
“How could that be?” In fact, there are good reasons why the net cost is probably
zero, when you look at how welfare states run in the real world. Let us survey a few
of them here.
The welfare-state tax mix is better for growth
A closer look reveals that the high-budget welfare states, while taxing heavily
overall, actually favor types of taxation that mainstream economists think are
better for economic growth. To see how their choice of taxes departs from some
common beliefs about the sloppy and bloated welfare state, consider the kinds of
taxes shown in Exam Question #1. Many people think of the welfare state as a place
where big government soaks the rich, taxing corporations, capital, and top
property incomes so heavily that many of them try to take their money out of the
country. Not so. The correct answer in Exam Question #1 is answer (a), that the
welfare states do not tax corporations or capital or top property incomes more
heavily than low-social-budget countries like the United States, Japan, or Switzer-
land. One might have been mislead on this point back in the 1970s or 1980s when
reading news that the top income tax rates were very high in, say, Sweden. Yet
even back then corporations and the richest seldom paid the top statutory rates,
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Exam Question #1Which of the following tax rates is not higher in big-government
welfare state than in a small-government country like the United States?
(a) tax rate on corporations, capital, and top property incomes
(b) tax rate of labor
(c) tax rate on consumption (like sales tax)
(d) sin taxes (on tobacco, alcohol, gasoline)
thanks to a host of deductions and loopholes. And since the early 1990s Sweden
and other European countries have simplified their tax systems so as to levy lower
top tax rates.
If the high-budget welfare states don’t tax corporations, capital, and top
property incomes any more heavily than does the United States, what other taxes
do they levy to pay for those bigger social budgets? For one thing, they do levy
higher taxes on the human earnings of everybody from janitors up through doctors
and lawyers, labeled as “labor income” in answer (b). This kind of tax could by
itself have negative effects on economic growth. Yet North American economists,
when polled on the subject of taxation, feel that taxing labor income is definitely
better for economic growth, because labor supply is less sensitive to taxation than
is capital supply. One should also note that the heavy taxes on labor bring the tax
burden to rest on the same income groups that vote in favor of the welfare state.
To some extent, workers pay for the safety nets designed to protect the least
fortunate among them.
Welfare-state governments also levy heavier taxes on general consumption, the
kind of levy mentioned in answer (c). Such taxes, in the efficient form of a European
“value added tax” (VAT), are favorites among economic conservatives. They have
the pro-growth virtue of not double-taxing savings. It is striking that this pro-growth
kind of taxation takes a bigger tax bite in the welfare states of Europe than in the
United States, where conservatives have traditionally called for it.
Finally, it is the welfare states, especially those in the Nordic countries, that have
the heaviest “sin taxes.” Again, they have chosen taxes that mainstream economists
would defend. Such addictive products as alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline, bring
negative externalities to society, in the form of bad health and bad air. How does
relying on these kinds of taxes harm economic growth and well-being? Yet these
are the kinds of taxes that are kept lower in the United States.
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Their work disincentives are not much worse
Given that the average tax rate on labor is higher in Europe, one might expect
that work, and therefore output, is more discouraged there. Work indeed bears
some burdens from policy in many European countries. Yet the policies are both
more and less than the average tax rates on labor would suggest. As far as the welfare
state package of policies is concerned, the burden is less than one would think,
because of how the aid to the unemployed is designed.
What hurts employment in Europe beyond the labor tax rate is something
unrelated to the welfare state. The main policy culprit in cutting European jobs
and output is that set of employee protection laws dating mainly from the 1960s
and 1970s, not welfare-state safety nets payments like unemployment compensa-
tion. The employee protection laws made it very hard for employers to lay off
workers. Two effects of protecting jobs for those who have them are (1) to lower
productivity, by giving job tenure to less productive workers that an employer
would have laid off,4 and (2) make employers more reluctant to hire new workers,
for fear that they may not work out but then cannot be laid off. Such employee
protection laws are a reason why many in Europe, especially young job seekers and
women, find it hard to get jobs. Yet this is not a feature of the welfare state. The
welfare-state countries that provide the strongest safety nets (Nordic countries,
Netherlands, Austria) do not have particularly high unemployment rates. There
is more unemployment in other European countries having less generous safety
nets but tougher laws protecting senior workers (Belgium, France, Italy, and
Spain).
The welfare-state safety nets, such as basic family assistance and unemployment
compensation, are often designed so that they do not discourage work. The
unemployed are given retraining and job search help, and are pressured to take it.
To illustrate how a higher-budget welfare state has actually given people more
incentive to take a job, consider the case of jobless single mothers. The realities of
recent history on this front are well illustrated with Exam Questions #2.
Exam Question #2  In which case was a poor single mother given the least incentive
to get a job?
(a) U.S.A. under Reagan
(b) U.S.A. under Clinton
(c) Britain under Tony Blair today
(d) Sweden’s welfare state today
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What has given poor single mothers the least incentive to work has been a policy
environment that takes away their welfare and other public benefits as soon as they
get a job. What would make a country actually do that, and face such women with
a huge marginal tax rate? The desire to keep welfare expenditures very low, so that
not one person above the poverty line gets any aid. Such penny-pinching, known
as strict means testing, was practiced by the conservative Thatcher-Reagan revival
of the early 1980s. Hence (a) is the correct answer to Exam Question #2.
Later on, bipartisan reforms in the Clinton years improved work incentives at
the bottom of the U.S. income spectrum. The first improvement came when the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was made more generous in 1993. That, and
accompanying adjustments of state-level benefits, gave jobless single mothers a
stronger incentive to take that first low-paying job and get started on an
employment history. Then the 1996 welfare reform added a tough-love dimen-
sion by setting term limits on welfare. The combination of the two has decreased
welfare caseloads without raising poverty, even after the recession of 2001-2002.
Meanwhile, Britain under Tony Blair made a similar reform to the EITC, undoing
the strict means testing of the Thatcher era. And a welfare state like Sweden never
had such a heavy tax on getting a first job, because family benefits were retained
when one got a job, and the tax rate on extra earnings remained moderate.
Investing in mothers’ careers
The welfare states also gain jobs and productivity through public policies that
invest in career continuity and skills accumulation for mothers. This matters a lot,
now that such a large share of women are career-oriented. Welfare states provide
paid parental leaves and public day care with qualified providers. While it is not
easy to estimate the gains in productivity from micro-data, there is at least one
aggregate sign of strong gains: Women in such countries have market wage rates
that are much closer to wage rates for men in the United States or Japan or
Switzerland.
Health care: our Achilles heel
On the other side of the coin, the United States seems to have shortened life
expectancy and wasted part of GDP by refusing to take a universalist approach that
insures health care for all. The symptoms of this shortfall are many. Americans die
younger than people in countries that have a greater share of their health expenses
paid for by taxes. We rank 19th out of 20 rich countries in life expectancy.
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Granted, not all of the extra U.S. mortality is due to our health care system.
Americans have worse health habits and slightly more pollution exposure. Our
health habits are world famous — especially bacon double cheeseburgers, fries,
Krispie Kremes, and double lattés. But when you weigh all the separate sources of
survival statistically, the health care system looks guilty of causing a significant part
of our early death.
And it costs way more. We spend the world’s greatest share of income on health
care. We have the highest bureaucratic costs — our system imposes greater
administrative costs trying to keep people from being insured and compensated
than other countries spend administratively on providing care to all.
Obviously, for those with high incomes, we have the best cutting-edge medical
care in the world. But few can afford it, and the young go on dying. Little wonder
that in recent surveys of opinions about health care, Americans were more
dissatisfied about their health care than any people in other country. The World
Health Organization has ranked the United States 37th in the quality of health
care delivery, mainly because health care is out of reach for so many in this country.
What social sector does America handle best?
If health care is the social sector that America handles worst among the top
twenty rich democracies, what social sector do we handle best? What we handle
best, by far, is the social sector that has the least to do with the poor, the sick, and
the elderly: higher education. The American system of higher education is clearly
the best by far. This country has wisely chosen about the right amount of
government subsidy for higher education, an amount appropriate to the fact that
higher education does bring some “external” benefits, some favorable spillovers to
the general population through the advancement of knowledge. Yet we have
wisely avoided making the government pay for all of higher education, or even half
of it. We force the public universities to compete with each other and with private
universities for research grants, for faculty talent, and for student talent. Individual
faculty members have to compete by teaching well, since this country attaches
more importance to student evaluations of faculty than does any other country.
Good old American competition works well in higher education.
Let us turn to the two main threats to social budgets in the twenty-first century.
Turning to threats after having explained that social transfers look comfortably
costless in terms of GDP does not involve any slip of logic, any inconsistency. The
threat and the comfort are both real, because they operate in different dimensions.
Our solution to the free lunch puzzle showed how actual welfare-state policies
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avoided any cost in terms of national product. The two threats on the horizon may
also involve no loss of GDP, once the political process has stumbled toward its best
way of adjusting to the threats. Yet there is an undeniable budgetary threat to
different interest groups, which are already causing political tensions.
U.S. pensions — future tense
The big scare: Can you spare $44 trillion?
Two years ago two economists working for the U.S. Treasury estimated that the
current path of Social Security and Medicare will be $44 trillion in the red over
the next 75 years. To pay that off, we would have to sacrifice four years of GDP,
four years of everything this country produces. The same alarm has been sounded
in a new book by Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns, two other Republican-
leaning writers.5 Let us look at some reasons why their alarm is well timed, and
reasons why they have sounded it too loudly.
The curse of longer life
One force setting off the alarm is real and undeniable. Our pension policies are
cursed by the continuing advance in human life expectancy. The lengthening of
life is especially bad (or good) in Japan and Italy, who will have the world’s oldest
populations by 2050.
The aging is less severe in the United States, however, because we take in more
immigrants and we have more children. To keep our Social Security accounts in
balance requires, over the next 30 years, only two percent of GDP. We could raise
taxes by that much and solve it, but we won’t need to. More likely, we’ll continue
on the good path we’ve already started down. Slowly raise the retirement age for
receiving full benefits. Current law raises it to 67 by 2023. We could afford to raise
it to 69 soon. And why not? Our life expectancy is growing fast enough so that the
next generation could work two years longer without raising the share of life spent
at work.
If just delaying the full-benefits retirement age doesn’t achieve full balance, then
we could let full-retirement benefits grow slightly less than the average income. It
can all be done gently with without significant pain. In fact, we will achieve this
decline in the ratio of average benefits to average wage just by doing nothing. We
have already indexed Social Security benefits to the cost of living, which rises more
slowly than the average wage in the long run. So without upsetting oldsters by
cutting Social Security payments, and just staying with existing practice, we will
quietly trim the relative benefit.
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Indeed, these are the quiet steps already taken by Norway and Sweden when
their populations became particularly elderly in the 1980s. They slowly length-
ened the age for full retirement benefits, and they did not keep benefits per
pensioner up with the advances in wages. The scare story is misleading.
It’s both public and private
The pension crisis does not come from having the government involved, and
privatizing pensions would not solve it. The first problem with telling everybody
to save for their own private future concerns intergenerational politics. One
generation or another would have to take a huge hit. If we said that young workers
could save for their own retirement and be excused from contributing to Social
Security, the current generation of retirees takes the hit, losing the pay-as-you-go
benefits they had counted on. If instead the young workers are told to keep paying
for the current oldsters’ pensions while separately saving for their own later
retirement, they would be paying for two generations of retirement out of one
work career. This transition problem is probably fatal for the idea of re-privatizing
Social Security.6
The other problem is that private pensions cost just as much and face the same
pressures from aging as do public pensions. They too have to struggle with longer
life expectancies than they had first projected. To this strain must be added the risk
of default on private pensions. So troubled are some big private pensions, like
United Airlines and Enron, that we as taxpayers may have to bail out their
pensioners, through our Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation established back
in 1974. It could be as bad as the $150-200 billion we taxpayers had to pay to bail
out depositors in the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s.
But the US should have less of a pension problem than some other countries —
as long as we control the whole government budget
As already noted, the United States does not face the greatest pension pressure
from population aging. We are not aging as fast as other countries, for three
demographic reasons. We have more children than the Japanese, the Italians, and
some other countries. We let in more young adult immigrants, the same tendency
that helps reduce the pension pressure on Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
And we die a little younger.
Even though the problem of population aging is real, it is easily eclipsed by even
bigger budget problems caused by fiscal mismanagement. Fiscal mismanagement
is the one worrying thing that the U.S. has in common with Japan and Italy. Here
10
is a quick reckoning of the dangers facing these three countries.
Japan has a looming pension crisis for two reasons. In addition to its rapid aging,
Japan has to come to grips with its huge overall budget deficits, which have
hovered near eight percent of GDP for about a dozen years. This stirs up trouble
for pensions, or for any other item in the government budget. The trouble,
however, has nothing to do with the welfare state. Japan doesn’t have much of a
welfare state, and their pension policies are not badly flawed. Rather the whole
budget has been reeling under the poor growth of the whole economy ever since
the asset market bubble burst around 1990. It’s a story of not cleaning up the
financial system, not a story of the welfare state.
Italy asked for trouble by offering many male workers generous subsidies for
early retirement since the 1980s. It did so largely because its tight job protection
laws denied employers any other way to shed their less productive senior workers.
This is a dangerous approach when you have one of the world’s oldest and
healthiest populations. Italy is in deep trouble and will have to adjust soon. Watch
the newspapers on this one. But core welfare states like Norway and Sweden have
no such problem because they already make people work a long time to get full
benefits.
The United States should have had little trouble, both because we are aging
more slowly and because we wisely did not subsidize early retirement. However,
we have asked for trouble by suddenly switching to what some have called faith-
based budgeting: slash taxes for top income groups, crank up spending, and pray
for the best. Suddenly we are in second place among rich deficit-running rich
countries, with a deficit of over five percent of GDP, behind only Japan.
September 11 is less than half the sudden deficit story. A bigger hole has been
caused by the annual Bush tax cuts. These alone are costing the government at least
2.5 percent of GDP. Then there’s the extra spending on prescription drug
subsidies, farm subsidies, home security, and a home-grown war in Iraq. That’s
what really strains the budget — not the need to fine-tune Social Security in the
years ahead.
Health Care — Future Tense
With health care, even more than with pensions, the social policy problem is
complicated, though not insoluble. Part of the complexity comes from trend that
should be good. Part comes from special problems, both with the nature of health
care markets and with this country’s policy history.
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The curse of prosperity and medical progress
Just as the pension crisis shows a dark cloud next to a bright silver lining, so does
the health care crisis. With pensions the bad good news was that we live longer.
With health care, the bad good news is that we are richer and the practice of health
care is getting better and better. As we get richer, we shift a greater and greater share
of our expenditures toward health care, because the demand for health care is
income-elastic. Meanwhile, across the twentieth century health care quality rose
so dramatically that it became something worth spending heavily on. A hundred
years ago, there was less reason to pour money into health care even if you were
sick, because there was less prospect back then that buying a lot of care would do
much good. Unfortunately, health care is an industry that does not meet the
soaring demand so smoothly.
The underlying market problems with health care
The private marketplace beautifully solves many problems, but health care is not
one of them.
Health care has big information problems. You lack information as a prospec-
tive patient. When your doctor says you need something, do you know otherwise?
When your insurance company says they’ll cover many things and not raise
premiums, do you believe them? For their part, your health care providers also lack
good information about which insurance plan will default or suddenly impose
more red tape. Finally, your insurer doesn’t know as much about your health as
you do. Suppliers of health insurance face acute informational problems, unlike
suppliers of auto insurance. To insure drivers, just knowing the driver’s past
driving record and his or her age solves most of the information problem. But
health insurers find it much harder to get the corresponding information,
especially when patients and physicians share an incentive to submit claims for
excessive care and medication. The insurers invest a lot in bureaucratic adminis-
tration to weed out high-risk patients and limit claims.
Under these conditions of massive uncertainty, a voluntary private insurance
market breaks down, even in the best of private market worlds. A common
scenario of health insurance breakdown runs like this: Private insurers try to offer
insurance to the people who have the lowest risks. People who secretly know they
are at more risk try to pay for the insurance, while the healthier ones don’t buy it.
Costs rise. The insurance companies raise the premiums, and this repels healthy
people all the more. Poor and sick people stay uncovered, and throw themselves
on the emergency rooms later. Thus the market for voluntary private health
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insurance is inherently unstable. Good old competition doesn’t work as well in
health care as it works in, say, higher education.
How America stumbled into a system that’s broken
How this country’s health insurance and health care evolved has left us with a
worse response to the basic challenges of health care than the responses worked out
by other countries.
Our first misstep was to hook health insurance to jobs. This dates back to the
1940s and 1950s. During World War II, Milton Friedman has noted, the link to
jobs arose from wage controls. Firms needed to compete for workers in a fully
employed economy, but could not use wage hikes to attract them. So instead they
turned to other enticements, including generous health insurance. Also in the
1940s and 1950s, as Melissa Thomasson has explained, tax rulings solidified the
tax-example status of employer contributions to employees’ company-based
health insurance. Thus arose a subsidized demand for private job-group health
insurance – and a powerful insurance industry determined to keep things that way.
The defect in this, however, is that it gives rise to those scenarios of breakdown in
the market for voluntary insurance. Coverage is increasingly limited, and premi-
ums rise.
The second misstep came in 1965, when this country socialized medicine only
for the elderly. At first, the arrival of Medicare may have seemed a victory for the
health of seniors, and a defeat for the medical associations and insurance
companies that opposed it. Yet Medicare developed a drawback already latent in
the tax breaks for job-based health insurance plans: It subsidized demand in a
market where prices were uncontrolled. As patients and doctors raised their use of
insured health care, prices shot up faster than the overall cost of living. Soon
enough, Medicare and private insurance budgets were strained.
The resulting war between insurers on the one side and alliances of providers and
patients on the other was, and is still, unwinnable. In the late 1980s and early
1990s, the insurers stopped their losses by shifting to mechanisms their could
better control, such as Health Maintenance Organizations. The HMOs and other
managed-care institutions succeeded in stopping the escalation of costs, by
denying a large share of claims. Providers and the general public fought back across
the later 1990s. Claims, costs, prices, and premiums began to accelerate again. No
national victory is possible. The cycle is now being repeated with the expensive
Medicare Prescription Drug Act of 2003. It is a complex piece, including direct
compensation to drug companies and insurance companies, and a prohibition
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against the government’s using its power to negotiate price discounts on drugs. To
the extent that it actually subsidizes seniors’ drug purchases through a complicated
formula, the taxpayers’ help will have the same effect as before: prices will be raised
further.
Again, as with pensions, the underlying defects and dangers are as much with
the private side of the economy as with the public. While some may say that the
problem is with government-run Medicare, and may describe the Act of 2003 as
a Medicare reform, Medicare’s budgetary strains stem in large part from its being
embedded in a private system with uncontrolled prices and not-so-sovereign
consumers. Further privatization of American health care would yield some
combination of more uninsured health risk and higher prices, the exact combina-
tion depending on the political supply of taxpayers’ money.
How Does a Country Get Its Taxes and Universal Aid Right?
Could we ever have a world in which we do what economists think works best?
That world would have those rules for government intervention introduced at the
start of this address. In that good world, we would use government to correct for
externalities. Use taxpayers’ money to subsidize positive spillovers such as public
health and public education. Tax other activities that are bad for the rest of society,
such as pollution or crime. But don’t mess with markets that work fine, without
significant externalities, including international trade.
America’s approaching that world is a possibility, but it’s hardly easy given our
political and social realities. It is not easy for a country like ours, with so much
opposition to things public. But it can be done.
To see the political possibilities and the political hurdles in our way, let’s look
at how Sweden got its huge consumption taxes, and its welfare state, back in the
1950s. The wisdom of this choice was imposed not by any major political party
or lobby, but by the competitive political process. Right after the war, nobody
wanted the sales tax that later became Sweden’s huge value added tax (VAT). The
dominant Social Democratic Party and the dominant blue collar labor union did
not want it. Their coalition allies, the Communists, hated any kind of sales tax,
which fell heavily on workers. The bourgeois parties to the right also opposed the
sales tax, or any tax for that matter, and were not persuaded by promises that it
would make cuts in the income tax possible.
Yet the money had to be raised somehow, if the popular safety nets and pensions
were to be provided. The Social Democrats began to waver, realizing that raising
taxes on capital incomes would risk capital flight from Sweden. In the end Social
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Democratic leaders correctly guessed that the Communists would not dare to vote
no, and the sale tax came about. Once in place, it became an escalator that the
Social Democrats rode to ever-higher social budgets.
By contrast, ask what the consumption tax looks like in the United States.
Democrats dismiss it as a naked redistribution in favor of the rich. In the U.S.
setting, they are right, given that it has been proposed only as a replacement for
progressive taxes that fall more heavily on the rich, not as a way to fund universal
care.
The only way that Americans would get to a better system with universal health
insurance and other benefits, and with simpler flat taxes, would be through some
major breakdown in our system. The country does respond well to obvious all-out
crises. The most likely breakdown would happen in our health care sector. Perhaps
the need for universal health insurance and controlled health-sector prices will
become obvious enough that we will decide to phase out our whole job-related
private health insurance industry, and replace it with a cheaper, more effective
publicly funded system. Maybe we could pay for the cheaper public system with
consumption taxes and sin taxes, the kind that do little harm to economic growth.
Perhaps the better system could start at the state level in some bold North Central
state.
It’s possible, though not easy.
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Footnotes
1 This paper draws on my current book, Growing Public: Social Spending and Economic
Growth since the Eighteenth Century, two volumes (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
2 The main exceptions before the twentieth century were the noticeable amounts giving
through churches in the Netherlands and England. The fragmentary evidence on early
modern private philanthropy is surveyed in Peter Lindert, Growing Public, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004, Chapter 3.
3 See Growing Public, Chapter 18 and Appendix E. An earlier version of this evidence was
aired in Lindert, “Why the Welfare State Looks Like a Free Lunch,” National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper 9689 (2003), available at www.nber.org / Publications /
Working Papers.
4 Some might think that forcing employers to keep their workers longer would make the
employers invest more in making those workers productive. Yet on balance any such
favorable effect on productivity is outweighed by the inability to lay off those that turn out
to be less productive, according to the international statistical patterns (Growing Public,
Ch. 19).
5 See Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Scott Burns,The Coming Generational Storm (MIT Press,
2004). The projection actually relates to Medicare as well as to Social Security. Most of the
$44 trillion in projected costs were forecast for the second half of this century, the more
distant part of their 75-year span and the hardest to predict reliably.
6 It might appear that other countries have already made the transition back to privatized
pensions, but the appearance in deceiving. Pinochet gradually imposed privatization on
Chile, but he did not have to run for public office. Thatcher partially imposed it in Britain,
but British policy has since retreated back toward more public and pay-as-you-go pensions.
Enthusiasts for privatization have pointed to the increasing choice of pension plans offered





THE CLEMENS LECTURE SERIES
Saint John’s University
Collegeville, Minnesota
The Clemens lecture series was founded to further conversation on the ways that eco-
nomics can speak to the larger problems of our society and culture. It brings to Saint
John’s outstanding economists noted for their abilities to address the economic dimen-
sions of social issues and to sustain dialogue with the other fields of the liberal arts. It
also provides a valuable opportunity for students to meet both informally and in classes
with the visiting lecturer. The lecture series is designed to be practically useful in un-
derstanding daily life and is intended for a wide audience, including students, faculty,
the business and professional community, and members of the general public inter-
ested in the impact of economic issues in their lives.
The Clemens Chair in Economics and the Liberal Arts and the Clemens Lecture Se-
ries have been made possible by the generosity of William E. and Virginia Clemens.
For additional copies of the lectures write to: Dr. Daniel Finn, Clemens Professor of
Economics and the Liberal Arts, Saint John’s University, Collegeville, MN 56321.
COLLEGEVILLE, MINNESOTA  56321
